In this paper I extend a companion paper [22] to an in¯nite horizon and study the assignment in a frictional labor market where machines of di®erent qualities and workers of di®erent skills need to be matched through a time-consuming process to produce output. I characterize the e±cient allocation and show that there is an equilibrium to decentralize the e±cient allocation along the entire time path. As in the static model, the e±cient assignment in the in¯nite horizon economy may not necessarily be positively assortative. With calibration exercises, the model reveals that (i) wage inequality is signi¯cantly larger than the skill di®erence, (ii) the true inequality is even larger than wage inequality; and (iii) a skill-biased technological progress reduces inequality among workers who can use the new technology while increasing inequality between workers who can and workers who cannot use the new technology.
Introduction
In many markets each side contains heterogeneous agents and it is time consuming to match the two sides to produce \output". I call this two-sided matching problem a \frictional assignment".
The time-consuming friction is interesting not only because it is realistic, but also because it can overturn some well-known results established in frictionless environments such as Tinbergen [25] and Becker [2] . For example, matches may not necessarily be positively assortative (or positive for short), i.e., high attributes on the two sides of the market may not necessarily match with each other in equilibrium even when they are complementary in production. Despite recent interest in frictional assignments, e.g., [3, 20, 24] , there is little analysis of the e±cient assignment and its decentralization.
In a companion paper [22] , I characterized the e±cient assignment of machine qualities to skills in a one-period, frictional environment. I showed that the e±cient assignment can be non-positively assortative (or non-positive for short) and that it can be decentralized by a market mechanism. In the current paper, I extend the results to an in¯nite horizon economy and then calibrate the model to investigate the quantitative e®ects of a skill-biased technological progress.
The extension to in¯nite horizon is important for three reasons. First, in a one-period setting workers and¯rms that fail to get matched in the period represent a signi¯cant loss in social surplus. Concerned about this social loss, a social planner might assign machines to workers in a way di®erent from what is e±cient in an in¯nite horizon. So, it is important to show that the central results in the one-period setting are robust to dynamic considerations. Second, the one-period analysis cannot guarantee that the equilibrium is e±cient along the entire time path.
Third, a dynamic model is a natural and necessary environment to examine the popular argument that skill-biased technological progress is the main cause for the rising education premium in the US in the 1980s (see [10] ).
I characterize the entire time-path of the e±cient allocation and show that it has a unique, saddle-path stable steady state. This time path can be decentralized by a market mechanism that allows new¯rms to freely enter the industry in each period to choose machine qualities, post wages, and commit to hiring only particular skills for particular machine qualities at the posted wages. A key step in characterizing the e±cient allocation is to decompose the planner's problem into a sequence of one-period problems. Each of the one-period problems resembles the static problem analyzed in the companion paper [22] , and so I can translate the intuition for the static results to the dynamic environment. One such result is that the e±cient assignment is not positive when skills and machine qualities are only weakly complementary with each other in production.
The intuition is that the productive factors are not fully utilized in a frictional environment and so, when skills and machine qualities are only weakly complementary, the planner can use a nonpositive assignment to increase utilization rates of both high-quality machines and high skills, thereby increasing expected net output.
The numerical results from calibration are also interesting. First, wage inequality is signi¯cantly larger than the skill di®erence among workers, suggesting that e±ciency requires high skills to be awarded beyond their skill advantage. The relative wage between a worker with a bachelor degree and a worker with only a high-school diploma is about 17% larger than the corresponding relative skill. Second, wage inequality under-estimates the true inequality between skills in a frictional economy, because it ignores how the di®erence in matching rates across skills a®ects workers' expected lifetime wages. Third, a skill-biased technological progress increases inequality between workers who can use the new technology and workers who cannot, but it also reduces inequality among workers who can use the new technology. Overall inequality increases with the progress when only a small fraction of workers can use the new technology and falls when a large fraction of workers can use the new technology. 1 The wage-posting framework employed was analyzed¯rst by Peters [18] and Montgomery [16] , followed by [15, 4, 1, 6] . Those models analyze frictional markets where at least one side of the market is homogeneous and hence miss the gist of the assignment problem. Shimer and Smith [24] 1 The technological progress also generates wage inequality among workers of the same skill during the transition to the steady state, but such inequality disappears in the steady state.
analyze the two-sided frictional assignment, but they assume that matching is random, and so the equilibrium outcome is not e±cient in general. The companion paper [22] provides a detailed comparison with those models and other related models. In addition, those papers study the steady state but I study the entire time path of the assignment. Also, the quantitative analysis of how a skill-biased technological progress a®ects inequality is new in frictional assignment models. 2 On inequality, the closely related paper is [12] , which shows how a positive machine quality assignment can amplify inequality in an economy without matching frictions and how this inequality can persist when workers can accumulate skills. I¯x the skill distribution in the labor force and emphasize the matching frictions. Although the frictional economy has many quantitative features similar to the frictionless economy, it has a new source of inequality { the di®erence in matching rates across skills.
An Economy with Matching Frictions
Consider an economy where agents are all risk neutral, live forever and have a discount factor 2 (0; 1). Workers di®er in skills and, to make things simple, skills are observable and measurable by a one-dimensional object s (e.g., education attainment), which lies in a set S of discrete points with a minimum s L > 0 and a maximum s H . 3 There are a large, exogenous number of workers of each skill s, n(s). Machines di®er in qualities, denoted k 2 R + . A quality k machine costs C(k)=(1 ¡¯) to make and so C(k) is the rental cost per period. The distribution of machines is endogenously determined through¯rms' entry.
A worker can operate only one machine at a time. A skill s worker and a quality k machine together produce output F (k; s) and the two are complementary (i.e., F ks > 0). Utility is transferrable between¯rms and workers, and the pair (k; s) produces a surplus F (k; s) ¡ C(k). 4 Assumption 1. (i) C(0)¸0, C k (0) = 0, C k (k) > 0 and C kk (k)¸0 for all k > 0;
(ii) F k (k; s) > 0, F kk (k; s) < 0, F s (k; s) > 0 and F ss (k; s) < 0 for all s and k;
(iii) F ks > 0, F (0; s) = F (k; 0) = 0;
(iv) There exists a non-empty subset K ½ R + such that F (k; s L ) ¡ C(k) > 0 for all k 2 K.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard. Condition (iii) requires skills and machine qualities to be complementary and, for unmatched machines and workers, output to be zero. Condition (iv) says that even the lowest skill can produce positive net output with some machine qualities. Since F s > 0, for all skills there are machines that produce positive net output.
Let Á t (s) be the set of machine qualities newly assigned to skill s in period t. The assignment is positive if better machines are assigned to higher skills. This corresponds to Á 0
is a singleton for each s. I do not restrict Á t (s) to be a singleton, a priori. So, for new machines of each quality k t 2 Á t (s), the planner can assign a subset of unemployed skill s workers to match with these machines. Let me refer to new machines of quality k t and the subset of unemployed skill s workers assigned to match with them in period t as unit (k t ; s). Let the number of quality k t machines in this unit be M t (k t ; s), which does not include the machines that were already matched before t. The relative number of unemployed skill s workers to new machines in this unit (i.e., the tightness of this unit) is B t (k t ; s) and the total number of unemployed skill s workers in this unit is M t (k t ; s)B t (k t ; s).
To capture the matching friction in the simplest way, I assume that a worker can have a match with at most one¯rm in each period. This matching friction is the same for the planner as for¯rms in the decentralized economy described later in subsection 4.1. In particular, each skill s worker in the unit (k t ; s) is matched with a machine at a rate (1 ¡ e ¡Bt(kt;s) )=B t (k t ; s) and each machine in that unit is matched at a rate 1 ¡ e ¡Bt(kt;s) , implying a matching technology of constant returns to scale. Notice that a¯rm must rent the machine¯rst before recruiting, and so 4 For a random matching environment with non-transferrable utility, see [5] .
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the rental cost for that period is foregone regardless of whether the¯rm has a successful match.
If an unemployed worker and a vacant job get matched in period t, they produce immediately.
After production, some matches separate. Since the focus here is on recruiting rather than separation, I simply assume that each match with a skill s worker separates with an exogenous probability ¾(s) 2 (0; 1), with a realistic restriction ¾ 0 (s) · 0. 5 Once a worker is unemployed, he/she returns to the matching pool, available for assignment in the next period.
Firms and workers who already have a match do not search. That is, a worker matched with a machine k t 2 Á t (s) stays with that machine until separation. I borrow this restriction from a typical search model (e.g., [19] ) to simplify the analysis and to make the model comparable with a typical search model. 6 For the e±cient assignment, the restriction requires that the social planner do not re-assign a di®erent machine to a previously matched worker if that worker remains matched. Therefore, skill s workers who are newly matched in t and remain matched in t + 1 operate machines Á t (s) in period t + 1 instead of machines Á t+1 (s). The latter are for skill s workers who are newly matched in t + 1. 7
The processes of matching and separation generate dynamics in employment and unemployment. Let the total number of unemployed skill s workers at the beginning of period t be u t (s) and the total number of skill s workers employed after matching but before separation in period t be E t (s). Then,
where the sum in (2.2) is the number of new matches involving skill s workers in period t. 5 The sole purpose of allowing for ¾ 0 (s) < 0 is to make the model match the data better; other than this, readers can simply focus on the case ¾ 0 (s) = 0. Also, I assume that production immediately follows matching in the same period, rather than the typical assumption that new matches begin to produce in the next period. This di®erence in assumptions is inconsequential, but the current assumption makes it easy to interpret the results in the special case¯! 0 or ¾ ! 1 as ones in a static model. 6 If matched¯rms and workers could search, their incentives and options would be di®erent from those who are unmatched. So, the corresponding equilibrium would have a distribution of machine assignments and a distribution of wages for each skill. 7 Nevertheless, I will show later that Át+1(s) = Át(s) in the absence of shocks.
5
To provide a reference point, I characterize the frictionless assignment. If there is no friction in the labor market, all workers are matched instantaneously. The planner picks machine qualities Á p (s) for skill s workers to maximize the social surplus for each pair. That is, for each s 2 S, the frictionless assignment Á p (s) is such that
Under Assumption 1, Á p (s) is a singleton and is positive. It is also time-invariant. With free entry of¯rms, the competitive equilibrium that decentralizes this frictionless assignment exhausts all pro¯ts. So, the frictionless wage for skill s workers is
E±cient Assignment with Frictions
With the matching friction, the social planner maximizes the sum of net present value created by new matches in each period. Consider the unit (k t ; s). The vacancy cost for the period (t)
is the rental cost of the machine, C(k t ). If this machine is matched with a worker in period t,
the expected present value of net output created by the pair (accounting for the machine costs in period t + 1 and beyond but not that in period t) is
Notice that the discounting takes future separation into account. Also notice that the machine quality k t does not change over time for the pair, since there is no re-assignment for the pair as long as they stay matched. Let EAV (k t ; s) be the total expected social surplus in the unit (k t ; s),
i.e., the value added by new matches. Since each machine in the unit (k t ; s) matches at a rate (1 ¡ e ¡Bt(kt;s) ) and there are M t (k t ; s) such machines, then assign a number of machines (¯rms) and a tightness to unit (k t ; s) in period t, which solves:
for given initial employment hE ¡1 (s)i s2S (and hence given hu 0 (s)i s2S ).
The constraint (3.4) states that the number of unemployed skill s workers allocated for matching across di®erent units sum up to the available number u t (s).
The following lemma is the key step to solving the e±cient assignment problem. It decomposes the planner's problem as a sequence of one-period problems, linked only by the shadow price of (2.2). The lemma also provides a link between the e±cient allocation and the equilibrium allocation described later.
Lemma 3.2. For any given sequence f¸E t (s)g t¸0 , let k a t (s) and B a t (k a t (s); s) solve:
subject to
Let ¡¸E t (s) and¸u t (s) be the shadow price of (2.2) and (3.4), respectively. For 
Using (3.10) to eliminate¸u, (3.9) becomes (3.5) and (3.11) becomes (3.6) . That is, (3.5) and The objective function in (P o ) is¸u t (s), the social marginal value of skill s workers who are unemployed at the beginning of t (see (3.10)). To explain why it is so, consider the expected value added by a marginal increase in the number u t (s). When this additional worker is allocated to match with machines k t 2 Á o t (s), the matching probability of each machine k t increases by e ¡Bt(kt;s) =M(k t ; s), yielding a total increase in the present value of net output in the unit (k t ; s)
as e ¡Bt(kt;s) P V (k t ; s). The increase in employment today also reduces the available number of workers and the value added in future matches, which is measured by¸E t (s). The net increase in the present value of output in the unit (k t ; s) brought about by a marginal increase in u t (s) is
, as in (3.10). 8
The constraint for (P o ), (3.5) , is a zero net-pro¯t condition for machines. To see this, consider the e®ects of adding one machine k t 2 Á o t (s). This additional machine matches with a worker with probability 1 ¡ e ¡Bt(kt;s) and, if matched, it generates a value P V (k t ; s) ¡¸E t (s). The expected
The additional machine also increases congestion on existing machines in the unit (k t ; s), reducing the matching probability of each existing machine by Bt(kt;s) Mt(kt;s) e ¡Bt(kt;s) . Thus the total value crowded out is
). Eq. (3.5) requires the expected gain from an additional machine to be equal to the crowding out.
Lemma 3.2 suggests the following solution steps for the e±cient assignment. In step one, Ī
x the shadow price¸E and solve (P o ) for the assignment and the tightness as functions of¸E.
In step two, I invoke rational expectations to determine¸E through (3.6) and (3.7).
Step one is carried out below, while step two is a dynamic stability analysis which I delayed to Section 5.
De¯ne k max (s) and k min (s), respectively, by:
In Appendix A I prove the following proposition:
:
Then, for given f¸E t (s)g t¸0 , the e±cient assignment Á o t (s) exists and is a singleton for each s.
For¯xed¸E, the problem (P o ) is similar to the static problem studied in [22] and its solution can be illustrated by Figure 1 is given by the following¯rst-order conditions for (P o ): 
Decentralization
To decentralize the e±cient assignment, consider a competitive economy with the following features. The machine producing sector is perfectly competitive, where machine makers produce machines and rent them at the market rate to¯rms. Since the cost of producing a quality k machine is constant over time, the present value of rental income of machine k is equal to C(k)=(1 ¡¯) and the rental cost per period is C(k).
In the labor market¯rms and workers take the following sequence of actions:
(i) In each period t¯rms can choose any machine quality to pair with an unemployed skill.
When contemplating a machine quality k t for a skill s, a¯rm expects to face a market tightness, B t (k t ; s), which is determined by a zero-pro¯t condition for entry. That is, the¯rm anticipates that there are many other¯rms that can make the same pairing and so such pairing cannot make positive net expect pro¯t. This tightness schedule is speci¯ed later for every pair (k t ; s).
(ii) Taking the tightness schedule as given,¯rms select machine qualities Á t (s) for each skill s and choose a wage path fW ¿ (k t ; s)g ¿¸t for k t 2 Á t (s). If a¯rm chooses machine k t for skill s, the¯rm commits to hiring only skill s workers for the machine and to o®ering the wage path fW ¿ (k t ; s)g ¿¸t conditional on the match formation. Then all¯rms simultaneously announce the skill and wages to which they commit their machines. 9
(iii) Observing the¯rms' announcements, unemployed workers decide which¯rm to apply to, possibly with mixed strategies. If a¯rm receives applicants of the skill it committed to, it randomly chooses one to form a match. The pair exits the matching pool, produces, and the worker is paid according to the posted wage path until the pair separates. If a¯rm fails to recruit any worker of the desired skill, output is zero in the current period. The¯rm can incur the rental cost of machine again next period to seek a match. 10 I solve this equilibrium assignment problem in each period backward.
Wages for newly recruited skill s workers
Given¯rms' choices of machines and commitments to particular skills, consider the recruiting game in period t. Since¯rms with machines other than Á t (s) commit to not hiring skill s, unemployed skill s workers, and only those workers, apply to vacancies with machines Á t (s). For the recruiting game in period t, I can then isolate skill s workers and machines Á t (s) from other workers and¯rms. As in the e±cient assignment, I do not restrict Á t (s) to be a singleton a priori.
Let M t (k t ; s) be the number of machines k t 2 Á t (s) chosen for skill s. I will¯rst analyze skill s workers' application decisions and then characterize the wage decisions. 9 In an example of two types of machines and two types of skills, I illustrate the equilibrium outcome when¯rms can only commit to a wage schedule but cannot commit to hiring particular skills (see [23] ). 10 The qualitative results will be similar if each worker observes only two independently drawn announcements in each group of¯rms, but the exercise is more cumbersome (see [1] ). Similarly, one can allow¯rms to post the reserve wage rather than the actual wage and then hold an auction after receiving two or more applications. With this setup the actual wage equals the reserve wage if the¯rm receives only one application and equals zero if thē rm receives at least two applications. The reserve wage serves a role very much like the actual wage in the current framework but there is a dispersion in actual wages (see [13] ). Such a dispersion complicates the analysis without contributing much to the main issue here.
I am interested only in the symmetric equilibrium where, in any given period t, all unemployed workers of the same skill use the same strategy and all recruiting¯rms that choose the same machine quality for the same skill use the same strategy. This is justi¯ed by the focus on the limit economy with large numbers u t (s) and M t (k t ; s) (but with a¯nite ratio u t (s)=M t (k t ; s)),
where it is di±cult for agents to coordinate on asymmetric equilibria, including pure-strategy equilibria. 11 So, I suppress the index s in this subsection, referring to an unemployed skill s worker as an unemployed worker and to a new machine k t in the group Á t (s) as a machine k t .
Let p(k t ) be the probability with which an unemployed worker applies to a¯rm with machine k t . Denote the tightness for each machine k t by
Then, each recruiting¯rm with a machine k t¯l ls the vacancy in period t with probability
Similarly, each unemployed worker gets a job in period t with a probability
These are the matching rates used in the social planner's problem.
To¯nd the equilibrium wage path, let me compute the equilibrium payo®s. Denote A ¿ (k t ) = W ¿ (k t )=F (k t ) the wage share for period ¿¸t posted by a¯rm recruiting in period t with machine
) be the present value from period T onward of a utilized machine k t to a¯rm that successfully recruited in period t with a wage share path A t (k t ). Let J vT (k t ) be the present value from period T onward of a vacant machine k t . Similarly, let V eT (A T (k t )) be the present value from period T onward to a worker who has been employed from period t with a machine k t and a wage share path A t (k t ), and V uT be the present value of an unemployed worker in period T . Note that, unlike J f T and V eT , J vT and V uT depend not on speci¯c¯rms' wage o®ers but on all¯rms' wage o®ers, and so the dependence is suppressed. These value functions obey the following Bellman equations: Next, consider a single recruiting¯rm in the unit (k t ; s) that deviates to a di®erent wage share path A d t (k t )´fA d ¿ (k t )g ¿¸t , where the superscript d indicates deviation. All other recruiting¯rms in the unit (k t ; s) continue to post the share path A t (k t ). If the deviating¯rm succeeds in hiring a worker in t, it pays wages according to the share path A d t (k t ) until the job is separated. For the deviator, the present value of a¯lled job is J f t (A d t (k t )), computed in the same way as (4.2) with A d t (k t ) replacing A t (k t ). It can be rewritten as follows:
Note that, if the pair separates, the¯rm reverts to the equilibrium strategy and so the value of a future vacancy is una®ected by the¯rm's deviation. Similarly, if the¯rm fails to hire any worker in t, it reverts to the equilibrium share path A t+1 (k t ), which yields a discounted present valuē J vt+1 (k t+1 ). The surplus to the¯rm from¯lling the job is J ft (A d t (k t )) ¡¯J vt+1 (k t+1 ).
If an unemployed worker is hired by the deviating¯rm in period t, the worker receives a path of wages A d t (k t ) until the pair separates. The present value of the match to the worker is 13
, computed similarly to (4.4) as
Note that the continuation payo® to the worker after the worker fails to get a match or after the worker separates from the match formed in t is una®ected by the¯rm's deviation. The surplus
Let p d t (k t ) be the probability that each unemployed worker applies to the deviating¯rm. The deviator has a tightness lim u t p d t (k t )´B d t (k t ) and a matching probability 1 ¡ e ¡B d t (kt) . Each unemployed worker gets the job from the deviating¯rm with a probability (1 ¡ e ¡B d t (kt) )=B d t (k t ).
An unemployed worker must be indi®erent between applying to the deviator and to other¯rms with machines k t . Let ES t be the expected surplus that an unemployed worker gets from the market in period t. In a large market, ES t is una®ected by a single¯rm's deviation (see [4] ).
Then the deviator's decision solves:
If A t (k t ) is equilibrium wage shares, there cannot be any pro¯table deviation. So, the above problem must be solved by
Imposing these on the¯rst-order condition of the above problem, I have: denoted EP t (k t ), are
(4.9) 14
(4.10)
where P V is de¯ned in (3.1) and
Market tightness and assignment
The market tightness schedule fB t (k t ; s)g s2S;kt2R+;t¸0 is such that the expected net value of a vacancy is zero for all possible pairs (k t ; s) and all t¸0, i.e., J vt (k t ; s) = 0 for all (k t ; s) and all t,
provided that output from the pair (k t ; s) is at least as high as the cost of the machine. If output from a pair (k t ; s) is less than the machine cost, no¯rm will adopt k t for s in period t and so
With (4.10), the zero-pro¯t condition is:
otherwise. Taking the schedule fB t (k t ; s)g s2S;kt2R + ;t¸0 as given, each¯rm chooses machine qualities to maximize the expected surplus for each unemployed skill s worker. In period t, this decision problem can be formulated as follows:
In this problem, » t is taken as given by each recruiting¯rm since it depends on future values fV ut+¿ g ¿¸1 that are determined by all¯rms' actions. (ii) Given the tightness schedule, it is optimal for a¯rm to o®er a quality k 2 Á(s) to skill s and post the wage path fW t (k; s)g t¸0 if other¯rms with machine k post such a wage path;
Equilibrium and e±ciency
(iii) Given the tightness schedule, it is ex ante optimal for¯rms to choose machine qualities Á t (s) and commit to hiring only skill s workers for such machines.
Condition (i) gives the market tightness for equilibrium pairs as well as for pairs o® the equilibrium path. Condition (ii) requires wages to satisfy (4.8). Condition (iii) requires Á t (s) to solve the dual problem to (P ), i.e., each¯rm chooses machine qualities to maximize expected surplus, subject to the constraint that workers get at least the equilibrium expected surplus.
The equilibrium problem (P ) has the same form as the e±cient problem (P o ) and its solution can be illustrated by the same diagram, Figure 1 . For the equilibrium assignment to be identical to the e±cient assignment, it su±ces to show that the sequence f» t g t¸0 obeys (3.6), the process for f¸E t g t¸0 . I complete this procedure in Appendix B and summarize the result below. This e±ciency result is stronger than in the static model [22] , because the equilibrium decentralizes the e±cient allocation along the entire time path. 12 However, the key to the e±ciency is the same as in the static model, i.e., an unemployed worker's expected surplus in equilibrium (ES t ) equals expected social marginal value of the worker (¸u t ). Three factors are important for e±ciency. First, the decision rights are allocated properly. The agents who actively create matches, i.e., the¯rms, decide the split of the match surplus by posting wages. In contrast to the arbitrary surplus division through ex post Nash bargaining (e.g., [9, 17, 19] ), the proper allocation of decision rights ensures that the wage share re°ects workers' marginal contribution to the social surplus, a reminiscence of the condition identi¯ed by Hosios [11] . Second, there is full-°edged competition, not only in the sense of free entry of¯rms but also in the sense that each worker knows the wages posted by all¯rms (but see footnote 10). In contrast to limited competition in the search literature surveyed in [14] , where each worker¯nds one wage at a time, full-°edged competition ensures that¯rms select the machine quality to maximize the skill's social marginal value. Finally,¯rms can commit to the posted wage and to the speci¯c skill they advertized for. This enables¯rms to target an optimal machine quality to each skill, thus inducing ex ante e±ciency, although the¯rms may have incentive to consider a di®erent skill ex post when it fails to be matched (see footnote 9).
Stability and the Properties of the Assignment
So far I have¯xed f¸E t g t¸0 as an arbitrary sequence. To complete the existence analysis, I now show that the sequence f¸E t g t¸0 is unique under rational expectations. This amounts to showing that the dynamic system is saddle-path stable. From now on I omit the superscript o.
Local stability
In this subsection I also omit the skill index. To investigate dynamic stability, one can solve b t from (3.15) as a function of Á t , say b t = b(Á t ). Substituting this into (3.16) one can solve Á t as a function of¸E t , say Á t = Á(¸E t ). Substituting these functions into (3.6) one obtains:
Let ru t´ut =n be the unemployment rate of skill s workers. Then (2.2) becomes:
Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) form a dynamic system, in which¸E is a jump variable and ru is an endogenous state variable with an initial value ru 0 2 (0; 1).
Let me denote the steady state value of a variable by adding a superscript ¤ to the variable.
The steady state values, (¸¤ E ; ru ¤ ), are given by setting¸E t =¸¤ E and ru t = ru ¤ for all t in (5.1) and (5.2). The following proposition states existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 5.1. The equilibrium has a unique, locally stable steady state. Under rational expectations, (¸E t ; b t ; Á t ) = (¸¤ E ; b ¤ ; Á ¤ ) 8t¸0 and the sequence fru t g t¸0 decreases monotonically toward the steady state level.
The planner assigns the same machine quality and tightness for unemployed skill s workers in all periods as in the steady state. If there is an unanticipated shock to the economy, (¸E; b; Á)
all jump immediately to their new steady state levels. That is, workers who are matched after the shock are assigned to the same machine qualities as in the new steady state. In contrast, workers who were already matched before the shock continue to work with the old machines. The fraction of old machines in use gradually declines toward zero as workers gradually separate from old machines and match with new machines. Also, employment and unemployment gradually adjust to their new steady state levels.
Remark 2. Since f¸E t ; b t ; Á t g t¸0 are constant sequences except the initial jump, I suppress the time subscript on these variables and the superscript ¤ on their steady state levels. With constanţ E , the concavity assumption, (3.14) , can be rewritten as follows by substituting¸¤ E for 1 E :
Properties of the assignment and the tightness
To analyze the assignment and the tightness, I rewrite (3.15) and (3.16) as:
where C = C(Á(s)) and F = F (Á(s); s). For the wage rate, note that (V u ; V e ; w) all jump immediately to their steady state values. I can use (4.8) and other value functions to solve for the wage rate as
I only describe the properties of the assignment for a special case ¾(s) = ¾. The same properties will hold when ¾(s) is only slightly decreasing in s. Since the properties are similar to the ones in the static model [22] , I will be brief and omit the proofs. 
A higher skill has a higher matching rate, i.e., b s (s) < 0, if and only if It is not surprising that expected surplus is higher for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers. However, it is not obvious why wages increase with skills when the assignment is positive. A priori, one might expect that high-skill workers can have su±ciently higher matching rates than low-skill workers, which can make the actual wage decrease with skill and yet the expected wage increase with skill. This does not happen in equilibrium. Proposition 5.3 also states that the marginal reward to skill, w s , is less than the marginal product of skill if and only if the matching rate increases with skill. This is simple to explain. When the matching rate increases with skill, a worker with a higher skill is compensated by a higher matching probability and so the wage need not increase by as much as the contribution of the incremental skill to output. In fact, when the compensation through an increased matching probability is su±cient, the wage can even fall with skill. The production function and the cost function are:
Numerical Exercises
There are eighteen parameters: the skill distribution in the labor force fn(i)g 4 i=1 , skill levels fs(i)g 4 i=1 , separation rates f¾(i)g 4 i=1 , the discount factor¯, the parameters in the production 20 function (F 0 ,®), and the parameters in the cost function (C 0 ; C 1 ;°).
Normalize F 0 = 1. Also, interpret the length of a period as one quarter and choose¯= 1:04 ¡1=4 to give an annual real interest rate as 4%. I identify the other 16 parameters by the following restrictions:
(i) Normalize the size of the total labor force to 1 and match the skill distribution in the labor force to the following numbers: n(1) = 0:1091, n(2) = 0:3275, n(3) = 0:2796, and n(4) = 0:2839.
These numbers are for 1996 (computed from [26, 1997, (ii) Normalize the machine quality assigned to group 2 as Á(2) = 100.
(iii) Match the unemployment duration of group 2 workers to one quarter. This number is realistic because a large fraction (more than 70%) of unemployed workers¯nd jobs in a quarter.
(iv) Match the unemployment rate of group i workers, ru(i), to the following numbers: ru(1) = 0:109, ru(2) = 0:055, ru(3) = 0:041, and ru(4) = 0:022. These numbers are for 1996 ([26, 1997, Table 657 , p420]).
(v) Match the relative wage rate of group i to group 2 workers, RW (i), to the following numbers:
RW (1) = 0:6609, RW (3) = 1:2794, and RW (4) = 2:2213. These numbers are computed from [26, 1999, Table 756 ], using median income in each group in 1997.
(vi) Match the overall wage/output ratio to a realistic number 0:64 (see [7] ).
(vii) Minimize the deviation of the capital/output ratio from 3:32, a number computed by [8] . Table 1 lists the parameter values (see Appendix D for computation procedures). 14 Notice two features of the identi¯ed parameters. First, a higher education attainment indeed corresponds to a higher skill. A worker with a bachelor or higher degree has roughly 1:9 times the skill level as a high-school graduate. Second, the job separation rate is negatively related to the skill level, as I assumed. The quarterly separation rate is 1:53% for a worker with a bachelor or a higher degree, compared with 6:76% for a worker without a high-school diploma. The higher separation rate and the lower matching rate contribute to a higher unemployment rate of a less skilled worker. in the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. This is not surprising. Since not all machines get a match in the frictional economy, expected social surplus from a machine is lower in the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. To break even, the frictional assignment must use a cheaper (and hence lower-quality) machine and pays the workers less than the frictionless assignment does. These di®erences between the two economies are small. The maximum di®erence is 2:93% in machine quality and 3:33% in wages, both occurring at i = 1.
Second, wage inequality is signi¯cantly larger than the skill di®erence, partly because of the positive assignment. Figure 2: 3 depicts the wage of each group relative to group 2 and the relative skill RS(i)´s(i)=s (2) . The relative wage is smaller than the relative skill for i = 1 and is higher than the relative skill for i = 3; 4, both indicating larger inequality in wages than in skills. The largest di®erence between the relative wage and the relative skill in the frictional economy is 17:05%, occurring at i = 4, and the smallest di®erence is 6:44%, occurring at i = 3. Another way to see the magni¯cation is to compare the standard deviation of log wages with the standard deviation of log skills. The standard deviation of log skills is 0:3045. The standard deviation of log wages is 0:3855 in the frictionless economy and 0:3916 in the frictional economy. 15 Third, the di®erence between the relative wage and the relative skill comes from more sources in the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. In the frictionless economy, the di®erence comes entirely from the positive machine assignment, as is clear from (2.4). In the frictional economy, such a di®erence also comes from the matching rate and workers' share of the match surplus. Figure 2 :4 depicts the matching rate (de¯ned in (4.1)) and the worker's share in a match
The matching rate increases with skill; so does the workers' share.
Finally, the relative wage under-estimates the true inequality in the frictional economy, because wages do not fully capture the e®ect of di®erential matching rates on inequality. The true measure of worker's welfare is the following ex ante present value:
where V e and V u are the present value of an employed and an unemployed worker, respectively.
The corresponding welfare level in the frictionless economy is V p (i) = w p (i)=(1¡¯). The standard deviation of ln V p is the same as that of ln w p , i.e., 0:3855. However, the standard deviation in ln V is 0:4023, higher than that in log wages (0:3916).
A skill-biased technological progress
A popular argument for the rising education premium in the US in the 1980s is that high-quality machines became less costly to make and workers with high education bene¯ted more from this technological progress than workers with low education (see [10] ). The current numerical example provides a natural environment to examine how such a skill-biased technological progress a®ects inequality, since better machines are indeed assigned to workers with higher education in the current example.
Suppose that the technological progress is unexpected and lowers the marginal cost of machines. The progress is skill-biased, because workers know how to use the new technology only if their skill is at least as a high as a critical level, s(i 0 ), say. Let Á 0 (¢) be the assignment with the old technology. Since Á 0 is positive, I can model a skill-biased technological progress as follows:
In this formulation, I set C 0d (< C 0 ) to be such that the cost of the machine Á 0 (4) is 20% lower under the new technology than under the old technology. That is, C 0d [Á 0 (4)]°+ C 1 = 0:8 (C 0 [Á 0 (4)]°+ C 1 ). The number k 0 (·) is a critical machine quality, modelled as k 0 (·)Á 0 (1) j1 ¡ ·j + Á 0 (4) j·j (· 2 [0; 1]). That is, only when skill i's original assignment is at least k 0 (·) can the skill use the new technology. The corresponding i 0 is i 0´c eil
ceil(x) is the smallest integer equal to or larger than x. A higher · implies a higher i 0 and hence a more skill-biased technological progress. I examine four values of ·, 0; 0:2; 0:4 and 0:6, which imply i 0 = 1; 2; 3; 4, respectively. Notice that the original assignment Á 0 can be generated by setting · to a value larger than 1. I denote this large value of · as base.
The technological progress generates within-skill wage inequality as well as between-skill inequality. The within-skill inequality occurs only along the transitional path and among workers who can use the new technology. Those who were not employed before the shock are assigned to new machine qualities but those who were employed before the shock continue to work with the old machines. For the same skill s(i)¸s(i 0 ), these two groups of workers have di®erent wages. 16 As the transition proceeds, however, the workers with skills at or beyond s(i 0 ) gradually separate from the old machines and the within-skill wage inequality disappears in the new steady state.
I compare the new steady state with the one before the shock. Use ¢ to denote the percentage change of a variable under the new technology relative to the old technology, e.g., ¢Á(i; ·)´Á (i; ·) Á(i; base) ¡ 1: In contrast, wages do not increase uniformly across skills that can use the new technology (see Figure 3 :2). If · = 0, for example, group 1 workers' wage increases by the most in percentage terms, around 15:5%, and group 4 workers' wage increases by the least, around 11%. As a result, the wage relative to group 2 increases for group 1 workers and decreases for groups 3 and 4 (see The explanation for this non-uniform response in relative wages is that the number of machines increases by more for the critical skill s(i 0 ) than for higher skills. Since low-quality machines are cheaper to make than high-quality machines, the decrease in the marginal cost of machines increases the pro¯t margin of¯rms with low-quality machines by more than that of¯rms with high-quality machines. To restore equilibrium there is a larger entry of¯rms targeting skill s(i 0 ) than targeting higher skills. This larger entry pushes up the wage for group i 0 by more than the wages for higher skills. Figure 4 :4 supports this explanation. It shows that the matching rate of group i 0 increases by more than those for higher skills.
This analysis suggests that a skill-biased technological progress, at least the one modelled by (6.1), has opposite e®ects on overall wage inequality. Obviously, such a progress increases wage inequality between the skills that can use the technology and the skills that cannot. But it also reduces inequality within the skills that can use the new technology, as argued above. 
Conclusion
In this paper I extend a companion paper [22] to an in¯nite horizon economy and study the assignment in a frictional labor market where machines of di®erent qualities and workers of di®erent skills need to be matched through a time-consuming process to produce output. I characterize the e±cient allocation and show that there is an equilibrium to decentralize the e±cient allocation along the entire time path. As in the static model, the e±cient assignment in the in¯nite horizon economy may not necessarily be positively assortative. With calibration exercises, the model reveals that (i) wage inequality is signi¯cantly larger than the skill di®erence, (ii) the true inequality is even larger than wage inequality, and (iii) a skill-biased technological progress reduces inequality among workers who can use the new technology while increasing inequality between workers who can and workers who cannot use the new technology.
I have abstracted from many realistic aspects of the labor market, and so the model allows for useful extensions in the future. On the assignment, one can introduce multi-dimensional skills, match-speci¯c productivity, private information and/or uncertainty in productivity. With these elements one can examine how¯rms use wages to retain workers and reveal productivity, in addition to the ex ante role of attracting workers. On inequality, one can follow [12] to introduce human capital accumulation and analyze how inequality can persist along a balanced growth path.
A. Proof of Proposition 3.3
First, let me reformulate the problem (P o ). Denote £(x) = 1 ¡ (1 + x)e ¡x . Since £(x) is strictly increasing for all x > 0, its inverse exists which is denoted µ(¢). Then, (3.5) can be rewritten as
Since this problem involves only skill s workers and period t, I suppress the indexes s and t in this proof. Next, let me¯nd the bounds for the solutions to (P o ). For the upper bound, notice that
Any solution to (P o ) must satisfy C k < F k ; otherwise ¤ 0 u (k) < 0 and so ¤ u (k) can be increased by reducing k. Since k max satis¯es C k = F k and since C k ¡ F k is an increasing function of k, the requirement C k < F k is equivalent to k < k max for all k 2 Á o .
The lower bound on the solutions to (P o ) is k min . To see this, note that the function
is an increasing function of k. It is negative at k = 0 and positive at k = k max . Thus, k min is well-de¯ned and k min < k max . Suppose that there is a solution to (P o ), say k a , such that k a · k min . Then F (k a )C k (k a ) · C(k a )F k (k a ) and so
> 0:
The¯rst equality in the middle step follows from (3.5), the inequality from¸E > 0 and the supposed condition C(k a )F k (k a )¸F (k a )C k (k a ). Then, k a cannot possibly solve (P o ), because increasing the machine quality slightly above k a increases ¤ u (k). The above arguments show that ¤ 0 u (k) > 0 for k = k min and ¤ 0 u (k) < 0 for k = k max . These properties imply that (P o ) has at least one maximum in (k min ; k max ) and all such maxima satisfy the¯rst order condition ¤ 0 u (k) = 0. To show that (P o ) has a unique solution, it su±ces to show that ¤ 00 u (k) < 0 for k 2 (k min ; k max ) whenever ¤ 0 u (k) = 0. (If ¤ u (k) has a second maximum it must also have a minimum, which satis¯es ¤ 00 u (k) > 0.) The latter condition is equivalent to
which is guaranteed by (3.14) . QED
B. Proof of Proposition 4.2
It su±ces to show » t =¸E t for all t. For this, I show that the sequence f» t g t¸0 obeys (3.6), the process for¸E t . With J vt = 0 for all t and with (4.11), I have:
The¯rst equality follows from setting J vt = 0 for all t in (4.11), the second equality from regrouping terms, the third equality from using the de¯nition of » t+1 , the fourth equality from (4.5) and (4.8) which imply V ut+1 ¡¯V ut+2 = ES t+1 , and the last equality from substituting (4.9) for ES t+1 . Thus, the sequence f» t g t¸0 obeys (3.6). QED
C. Proof of Proposition 5.1
From the de¯nitions of b(Á), Á(¸E) and ª(¸E) it can be shown that b 0 (Á) > 0, Á 0 (¸E) > 0 and
When¸E = 0, Á(0) 2 (k min ; k max ) and b(Á(0)) 2 (0; 1). Thus, ª(0) > 0. When¸E is su±ciently large so that the right-hand side of (3.16) approaches one, b ! 1, Á ! k max and so ª ! (1 ¡ ¾(s))¸E <¸E. Since ª 0 ¡ 1 < 0, these properties imply that there is a unique value¸¤ E that satis¯es ª(¸¤ E ) ¡¸¤ E = 0, i.e., the steady state value of¸E is unique. It is then easy to see from (5. 2) that there is a unique steady state value for ru.
To show that this steady state is locally stable, notice that the dynamics of¸E are autonomous, given by (5.1). Since 0 < ª 0 <¯(1¡¾(s)), the sequence f¸E t g t¸0 de¯ned by (5.1) is monotonically increasing if¸E 0 >¸¤ E and decreasing if¸E 0 <¸¤ E . The only rational expectations solution iş
Et =¸¤ E for all t¸0. That is,¸E jumps directly to the steady state level at time 0 and remains there forever. Since Á and b(Á) are functions of only¸E, they also immediately jump to their steady state levels. Substituting the solution of¸E into (5.2), we have a linear di®erence equation of ru, which can be solved to determine the sequence fru t g t¸0 with the initial value ru 0 . This sequence is a decreasing sequence i® ru ¤ < ru 0 . QED
D. Procedures to Identify the Parameters
Restriction (i) gives n(i) directly. For other parameters, the identi¯cation procedure is as follows. First, I solve the tightness for group 2, b(2). Restriction (iii) requires the unemployment duration of group 2 workers to be du(2) = 1. This implies a matching rate for group 2 workers, 1 ¡ e ¡1=du (2) . Since the matching rate implied by the model is ¹(2) = (1 ¡ e ¡b(2) )=b(2), I can solve for b(2) by matching the two. Second, I utilize restriction (iv). Notice that the unemployment rate for group i in the steady state is a function of ¾(i) and b(i). Matching it to the number in restriction (iv), I can solve ¾(i) as a function of b(i). Note that this identi¯es ¾(2) since b(2) is already identi¯ed.
Third, I solve the tightness for any other group as a function of ±´®=°, using equilibrium conditions. With ¾(i) being expressed as a function of b(i) from the last step, I can denote the right-hand side of (5.4) as A k (b(i)) and the right-hand side of (5.5) as A(b(i)). Then (5.4) and (5.5) yield
(D.1)
Note that Á(2) = 100 by normalization. The cost of machine Á(i) is
Abbreviate the coe±cient of C on the right-hand side of (5.6) as A w (b(i)) so that w(i) = C(i)A w (b(i)). Then, using (D.4), I can express the relative wage between groups i and 2 as
The right-hand side of the above equation is a function of only b(i) and ± after substituting (D.1).
Matching RW (i) to the speci¯ed number in restriction (v), I obtain b(i) as a function of the parameter ±. Fourth, I identify ± using restriction (vi). With b(i) as a function of ±, the level of employment of group i is also a function of ±, say E(i; ±). The overall wage/output ratio, weighted by employment levels, is (2) ; where F (i)´F (Á(i); s(i)). Note that w(2)=F (2) = A w (b(i))=A(b(i)) and
Then I can express the overall wage/output ratio solely as a function of ±. Matching this ratio to 0:64 according to restriction (vi), I obtain ±. Substituting this solution, I can calculate b(i), ¾(i), ¹(i), E(i; ±), A(b(i)), A k (b(i)) and A w (b(i)). Fifth, I utilize (vii) to identify other parameters. For a machine Á(i), the e®ective output is (1 ¡ e ¡b(i) )F (i) and so the capital/output ratio for machine Á(i) is Á(i) (1 ¡ e ¡b(i) )F (i) = KV (i;°) C 0 ; where KV (i;°)´± Á(i) 1¡°A k (i)(1 ¡ e ¡b(i) )
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Note that Á(i) is a function of only°after substituting (D.1) and the solutions for ± and b(i).
Weighted by the number of machines of Á(i), i.e. by M(i) = n(i)=b(i), the deviation of the capital/output ratio from the number 3:32 in restriction (vii) is
) 0:5
:
Minimizing this deviation, I obtain C 0 and°. Then ® = ±°. Finally, with Á(2) = 100, (D.2) solves for C 1 and (D.3) for s(i). This procedure identi¯es all parameters, as given in Table 1 . 
